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INTERSTATE AIR POLLUTION: OVER A DECADE OF
INEFFECTIVE REGULATION
KAY M. CRIDER

Air has no Residence, no Neighbor,/ No Ear, no Door,
No Apprehension of Another/ Oh, Happy Air!1
INTRODUCTION

At the close of the 100th Congressional session on October 22, 1988,
Congress had once again failed to act on any of the pending bills directed
at curbing air pollution and acid deposition. 2 Over the past several years,
Congress has continually debated whether to toughen the requirements
of the 1970 Clean Air Act, 3 only to abandon its efforts in the final days of
the session. A spokesman for the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) stated that he could not remember when action on such a major
4
environmental statute had dragged on so long.
One of the central issues in the controversy over the regulation of air
pollutants is the interstate pollution problem-frequently air pollutants
emitted in one state are carried into other states. In 1977 and 1980, Congress sought to provide a remedy for interstate pollution by amending the
Clean Air Act, 5 which as originally drafted did not address pollution
between the states. Unfortunately, these amendments have not proven
effective. Case law and statutory analysis demonstrate that there are no
current regulations or common law doctrines at the federal or state level
which provide an adequate remedy for states plagued by interstate air
pollution.
Part I of this Article will briefly summarize the scientific and health
aspects of air pollutants and then describe their contribution to the interstate pollution problem. 6 Part II will detail the Clean Air Act's regulation of interstate pollution and critically examine the specific language of
1. E. DIcKINSON, THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 483 (T. Johnson ed. 1955).
2. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1139 (Oct. 7, 1988). See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the bills.

3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
4. Bukro, Congress' Antipollution Talk Is All Hot Air Again, Chi. Trib., Oct. 30, 1988, § 4, at
4, col. 1.
5. See supra note 3. Congress amended § 110 (7410) and established § 126 (7426) to deal
specifically with interstate air pollution. These amendments are discussed in depth infra at notes 4249 and accompanying text.

6. See infra notes 10-41 and accompanying text.
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the statute and its effectiveness. 7 Part III will diagram other existing
alternative remedies, apart from the Clean Air Act, which are available
to parties affected by the interstate pollution problem.8 Part IV will focus on possible changes in the current law and analyze the potential effectiveness of each proposal. 9
I.

THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF AIR POLLUTION

A.

Air Pollutants

Air pollution occurs both artificially10 and naturally" in the form of
various particulate and gaseous compounds. The list of these undesirable
pollutants includes many types of hydrocarbon compounds (HC), sulfur
dioxides (SO 2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and trace
amounts of lead, mercury, asbestos, and chlorine. 1' 2 The pollutants
13
which cause serious harm to humans are subject to the most regulation.
For example, hydrocarbons cause or contribute to cancer and have been
14
linked to chronic injury in liver, kidney, skin, and lymphatic tissues;
5
sulfur dioxide can lead to cardiac and respiratory disease; nitrogen oxide impairs visibility and can cause chronic respiratory disease; 16 carbon
monoxide impairs mental functions and fetal development, aggravates
cardiovascular diseases, and decreases blood oxygen content; 17 and lead
impairs bone growth and the nervous, circulatory, reproductive, immune
and renal systems.18
The formation of these pollutants is caused by a variety of sources.
Internal combustion engines and fuel evaporation produce fifty percent
of the nation's hydrocarbons; in addition, the manufacture of asphalt,
rubber and petroleum products is partially responsible for hydrocarbon
7. See infra notes 42-136 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 137-88 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 189-218 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
11. Naturally occurring pollution occurs in the form of hydrocarbons and sulfur oxides
(formed by the decomposition of organic material) and carbon monoxide (resulting from forest fires
and volcanic eruptions). In addition, the presence of artificially occurring radiation and lead causes
the naturally occurring forms to increase. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 120-23 (1984).
12. Id.
13.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON HEALTH EF-

FECTS OF AIR POLLUTANTS 9-10 (1973).
14.

NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HEALTH EFFECTS OF HALOGENATED AROMATIC

HYDROCARBONS 273-324 (W. Nicholson & J. Moore eds. 1979); M. MEHLMAN, G. HEMSTREET, J.
THORPE & N. WEAVER, RENAL EFFECTS OF PETROLEUM HYDROCARBONS (1984).
15. W. CARNOW & E. BOUCHARD, HEALTH EFFECTS OF S02 AND SULFATES (1979).
16. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NITROGEN OXIDES 215-72 (1977).
17.

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CARBON MONOXIDE 68-167 (1977).

18.

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, LEAD IN THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 31-206 (1980).
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pollution.' 9 Nitrogen oxides form when air is heated to exceptionally
high temperatures; a process which occurs in power plant furnaces and
motor vehicle engines. 20 Carbon monoxide formation is also related to
motor vehicles; seventy-five percent of the nation's CO comes from the
burning of fossil fuels in motor vehicle engines. 2' The formation of sulfur dioxide is caused mainly by the burning of coal and oil in power
22
plants and the smelting of lead and copper.
All of these pollutants are capable of drifting across state lines, but
the compounds of primary interest in interstate air pollution problems
are nitrogen and sulfur oxides. 23 It is not the emission of the oxides
themselves which has generated the most concern, but rather the fact
that once airborne, these compounds become chemically transformed
into sulfuric and nitric acids, and often return to the earth in the form of
acidified rain and snow. 24 As a result, certain areas of North America
and Eastern Canada are experiencing precipitation which is twenty-five
to forty times more acidic than natural rainfall. 25 This phenomenon has
been termed "acid rain."
19. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 11, at 121. Reduction in
hydrocarbon emissions is achieved by proper motor vehicle engine tuning and the use of catalytic
convertors. Id. at 120.
20. Id. Current emission abatement techniques for nitrogen oxides are not as effective as they
are for other pollutants. Existing techniques include use of "three-way" catalytic convertors, the
reduction of combustion temperatures, and "scrubbing" the gases emitted from stacks with caustic
substances or urea. Id.
21. Id. The reduction in the formation of carbon monoxide is achieved in the same manner as
reduction of hydrocarbon emissions. See supra text in note 19.
22. Id. Emission of sulfur dioxide is successfully reduced by the use of low sulfur coal (obtained both naturally and through pretreatment of high-sulfur coal), by "scrubbing" gases emitted
from stacks, and by converting sulfur dioxide into sulfuric acid. Id. at 121.
23. Concern is mounting, however, over the long-range transport of aerosols. Recent studies,
which have used elemental tracers to track long-range transport of aerosols, have identified the Midwest as an important contributor to pollution aerosols in the Northeast. See Rahn & Lowenthal,
Pollution Aerosol in the Northeast: Northeastern-MidwesternContributions,228 SCIENCE 275 (1985);
Rahn & Lowenthal, Elemental Tracers of Distant Regional Pollution Aerosols, 223 SCIENCE 132
(1984).
In addition, toxic compounds such as furans and dioxins are suspected of traveling from the
southern states into Lake Superior. Brown, Toxic Wind, DISCOVER, Nov. 1987, at 42. This new
type of far-reaching air pollution has been termed "toxic fallout," analogized to other deadly pollutants such as DDT and PCBs. Id. at 45.
24. Wetstone, Air Pollution Control Laws in North America and the Problem ofAcid Rain and
Snow, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,001 (1980). Acid rain is formed when S02 and NOx
combine with water vapor in the air and "hydrolize" and "oxidize" to form H 2SO, and HNO 3,
sulfuric and nitric acid, respectively. Galloway & Likens, Acid Precipitation: The Importance of
Nitric Acid, 15 ATMOSPHERIC ENV'T 1081 (1981).
25. Wetstone, supra note 24, at 50,001. The entire acid deposition problem is not attributed
wholly to rain or "wet" deposition; "dry" deposition of acid also plays a significant role. "Dry"
deposition occurs when airborne acids drift down to the earth independent of precipitation. Id. at
50,002. Because dry deposition is not frequently or easily monitored, the primary focus of this Note
will be on wet deposition or acid rain.
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The History of Acid Rain

As far back as 1853, scientists were aware of acid rain.2 6 It was not
until 100 years later, however, that acid rain began to be studied on a
worldwide scale.2 7 At the 1972 United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment in Sweden, attention was focused on the acid rain
problem in North America.2 8 More recent studies reveal that acid levels
are now twenty times higher in parts of the Northeast than they were just
thirty years ago.2 9 The principal reason for this dramatic change is the
increase in emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides from the burning of
fossil fuels and the smelting of sulfide ores. 30 Moreover, emissions of
these oxides are expected to rise further as the present trend is toward the
31
increased use of coal as a source of energy.
Until recently, sulfur dioxide emissions were thought to be the major contributor to acid rain. Studies showed SO2 was at least seventy
percent responsible.32 As a result of these studies, strategies for reducing
SO 2 emissions are relatively well developed. 33 However, increased attention is now being given to the contribution of NOx in the formation of
acid rain. Current studies show that nitric acid has increased by about
fifty percent relative to sulfuric acid in the determination of acid rain
composition. 34 Thus, concern is mounting over the need for better im26. An English chemist, Robert Angus Smith, published the first report on the chemistry of
acid rain in 1853, diagramming its effects on the city of Manchester, England. However, the scientific community paid little attention to his research. J. SEINFELD, ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY AND
PHYSICS OF AIR POLLUTION 696 (1986).

27. Id. In 1961, Svate Odin, a Swedish chemist, began measuring the acidification of surface
water in Europe. Odin showed that acid rain was a large scale phenomenon and predicted the longterm ecological effects which we are encountering today. Id.
28. Wetstone, supra note 24, at 50,001.
29. Likens, Acid Precipitation, 54 CHEM. & ENG. NEWS 29 (1976). New York, New England,
and Pennsylvania have been targeted as the areas with the most acidic rain and snow. Likens,
Wright, Galloway & Butler, Acid Rain, 241 Sci. AM. 43, 48 (1979).
30. Likens, supra note 29, at 43. With the onset of the Industrial Revolution, the burning of
coal and oil in power plants and the smelting of lead and copper increased dramatically. In order to
alleviate local pollution problems created by new industry, the use of tall stacks became popular.
This, in turn, caused regional pollution problems. One copper-nickel smelter in Ontario, Canada,
has a superstack which is 400 meters tall. It has been estimated that this one stack emits 1% of the
total annual emissions of sulfur throughout the world. Id. at 44.
31. Id.
32. Glass, Mounting Acid Rain, 5 E.P.A. J. 25 (1979). This percentage was based on an average of SO 2 contribution throughout the year. In reality, SO 2 contribution is significantly greater in
the summer than in the winter due to temperature and weather patterns. Galloway & Likens, supra
note 24, at 1081.
33. Galloway & Likens, supra note 24, at 1084. This is not to suggest that these SO 2 strategies
have been adequately implemented.
34. Kavanaugh, Estimates of Future CO. N20 and NOx Emissionsfrom Energy Combustion, 21
ATMOSPHERIC ENV'T 463, 467 (1987); see also Galloway & Likens, supra note 24, at 1082-83. A
study which measured NOx combustion emissions per year on a worldwide basis found a 7% in-

crease from 1960 to 1975, a 13% increase predicted from 1975 to 2000, and another 15% increase
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plementation of NOx emission controls. 35
While our understanding of the relative contributions of sulfuric and
nitric acids to acid rain is still in flux, many of the current effects of
highly acidic precipitation are clear. The major known effects are: (1)
the acidification of lakes and streams, leading to mutation and death of
fish and other aquatic life; (2) the acidification of soil, which "unlocks"
previously inert toxic chemicals, causing them to leach into surrounding
water and plants; and (3) the severe damage and decline in the growth of
forests and forest ecosystems. 36 In addition, studies now show that acid
rain is having a significant effect on humans by causing toxic metals to
dissolve into the environment, thereby carrying these toxins into drinking water supplies and the food chain.3 7 Further, acid deposition takes
its toll on man-made objects through the erosion, corrosion, and degradation of historic structures, outdoor sculptures, museum and library ar38
tifacts, and construction materials.
During the late seventies, in light of the mounting evidence concerning the wide-ranging effects of acid rain, the problem became a congressional priority. Downwind states claimed they were bearing the brunt of
acid deposition caused by sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions in upwind
states. Congress, however, was reluctant to impose pollution control requirements which could make coal less attractive economically since coal
39
was the principal source of fuel that supplied the nation's power plants.
In addition, many of the previously enacted Clean Air Act programs had
from 2000 to 2025 if new regulations were not introduced. Kavanaugh, supra, at 467. The primary
reason for the increased contribution of NOx to acid rain over S02 is that NOx controls are much
more costly to implement than S02 controls. For example, Commonwealth Edison, the nation's
third largest power supplier, decreased its SO 2 emissions by 81% from 1970 to 1987 but only reduced its NOx emissions by 20% during that same period. Some reasons given for this disparity
include the ease and cost of using low-sulfur coal and scrubbers to decrease SO 2 emissions versus
installing completely new equipment in order to reduce the high temperatures of combustion which
produce NOx. Lecture by Chuck McDonough, Air Compliance Director of Commonwealth Edison,
at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law (March 10, 1988).
35. Galloway & Likens, supra note 24, at 1081.
36. R. GOULD, GOING SOUR: SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF ACID RAIN 63-80 (1985).

37. Id. at 75-77. In addition, some studies have shown that acid haze, mist, and fog can cause
severe respiratory effects, including death. These results are very controversial, however, because
the studies are not able to distinguish between acid sulfates and other forms of air pollution which
also affect respiration, such as nitrogen oxides and ozone. It is therefore difficult to get an accurate
measure of "acidic" air pollution on respiration. Id. at 77-78.
38. Baer, Effects of Acidification on Materials and CulturalProperty, in ACIDIFICATION AND
ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS 77 (T. Schneider ed. 1986). For example, estimates have shown that
several million dollars would be needed to refurbish and repair the United States Capitol building.
Although some of the degradation of these types of buildings is due to natural weathering, much of
the damage and corrosion has been linked to acid deposition. Id. at 77-78. Marble buildings, statues
and monuments are at highest risk because marble contains calcium carbonate which is dissolved by
acid. S. ZIPKO, Toxic THREAT: How HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES POISON OUR LIVES 164 (1986).
39. Wetstone, The Need for a New Regulatory Approach, 22 ENVIRONMENT 9, 14 (1980).
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been attacked by American industry as inflationary and overly restric4
tive, which created an adverse political climate for coal regulation. 0
Moreover, Congress was faced with the reality that coal would likely
continue as the primary means of meeting the nation's energy needs,
since the future of alternative energy sources such as oil and nuclear
power remained uncertain. 41 Yet after bitter congressional debates on
the issue, and despite strong coal industry opposition, the Clean Air Act
was amended to address interstate air pollution on a national level.
II.

INTERSTATE POLLUTION AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT

The first attempt by Congress to deal with interstate air pollution
came in 1977 with the amendment of section 110 of the Clean Air Act, as
well as the creation of section 126, an entirely new section that addresses
interstate air pollution. Section 110,42 originally passed in 1970, provides
that the federal and state governments share the responsibility for air
pollution control, with the bulk of enforcement resting with the states.
Federal input begins under section 109 with the promulgation of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) by the Administrator
of the EPA. 43 Once these standards are established for a particular pollutant, section 110 requires the state to submit a State Implementation
Plan (SIP) which provides for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the NAAQS for the pollutant. 44 In order to address interstate air pollution, section 1 10(a)(2)(E) was added in 1977 as an
amendment to section 110. Under this subsection, a SIP must contain
provisions which ensure that emissions from stationary sources within
the state do not prevent attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS in
another state or interfere with the prevention of significant deterioration
45
(PSD) in other states.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 41. Although the tension in the Persian Gulf has somewhat subsided, a definite
supply of foreign oil remains unpredictable. Also, in the face of the Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl incidents, reliance on nuclear power is becoming less attractive.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1981).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1977). The NAAQSs are implemented to protect the public welfare
"from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in
the ambient air" and contain an adequate margin of safety to ensure such protection. Id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). This subsection requires a state to submit a SIP within nine months
after promulgation of a NAAQS. Id. Each SIP must include emission limitations, schedules, and
timetables for compliance with the limitations as well as any other measures necessary to achieve the
NAAQS. Id. at § 7410(a)(2)(B).
45. The Administrator shall approve such plan ... [if] it contains adequate provisions (i)
prohibiting any stationary source within the State from emitting any air pollutant in
amounts which will (I) prevent attainment or maintenance by any other State of any such
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, or (II) interfere with measures
required to be included in the applicable implementation plan for any other State under
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Section 126 is the new section of the Act that is devoted solely to
interstate air pollution abatement. This section provides that a state
must notify nearby states of all major existing or proposed stationary
sources which may significantly contribute to air pollution problems in a
downwind state. 46 This section also authorizes affected states to petition
the EPA for a finding as to whether any major source from another state
47
is emitting or will emit pollutants in violation of section 110(a)(2)(E).
Upon a finding of violation, section 126 gives the EPA Administrator
authority to initiate enforcement actions in order to abate or reduce the
emissions of an existing source, to prevent the construction of a new
48
source, or provide an extension for compliance.
While these regulations appear to provide a remedy for the interstate pollution problem, neither section 110 nor section 126 regulates
acid rain directly; and acid rain is at the very core of interstate air pollution. A violation under these sections can only be found when the
NAAQS for either sulfur dioxide (SO2) or nitrogen oxides (NOx) is vioPart C of this subchapter to prevent significant deterioration of air quality or to protect
visibility, and (ii) ensuring compliance with the requirements of section 7426 of this title,
relating to interstate pollution abatement.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E).
46. Each applicable implementation plan shall (1) require each major proposed new (or
modified) source ... (B) which may significantly contribute to levels of air pollution in
excess of the national ambient air quality standards in any air quality control region
outside the State in which such source intends to locate (or make such modification), to
provide written notice to all nearby States the air pollution levels of which may be affected
by such source at least sixty days prior to the date on which commencement of construction is to be permitted by the State providing notice, and (2) identify all major existing
stationary sources which may have the impact described in paragraph (1) with respect to
new or modified sources and provide notice to all nearby States of the identity of such
sources not later than three months after August 7, 1977.
42 U.S.C. § 7426(a).
47. Any State or political subdivision may petition the Administrator for a finding that any
major source emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation of the prohibition of section
7410(a)(2)(E)(i) of this title. Within 60 days after receipt of any petition under this subsection and after public hearing, the Administrator shall make such a finding or deny the
petition.
42 U.S.C. § 7426(b).
48. Notwithstanding any permit which may have been granted by the State in which the
source is located (or intends to locate), it shall be a violation of the applicable implementation plan in such State- (1) for any major proposed new (or modified) source with respect
to which a finding has been made under subsection (b) of this section to be constructed or
to operate in violation of the prohibition of section 7410(a)(2)(E)(i) of this title, or (2) for
any major existing source to operate more than three months after such finding has been
made with respect to it. The Administrator may permit the continued operation of a
source referred to in paragraph (2) beyond the expiration of the three month period if such
source complies with such emission limitations and compliance schedules (containing increments of progress) as may be provided by the Administrator to bring about compliance
with the requirements contained in section 7410(a)(2)(E)(i) of this title as expeditiously as
practicable, but in no case later than three years after the date of such finding.
42 U.S.C. § 7426(c).
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lated. 49 Thus, when no NAAQS is violated, the interstate pollution
abatement provisions do not apply.
The fact that there is no violation of an NAAQS, however, does not
mean that a state is not causing pollution in a downwind state. As stated
earlier, acid rain results when S02 and NOx transform into sulfuric and
nitric acids, but there are no NAAQSs for these acids. As a result, no
matter how much an affected state is polluted by acid rain from another
state, the interstate pollution provisions will not be triggered under the
language of the statutes because acid rain cannot "prevent attainment or
maintenance" of an NAAQS. The presence of this dilemma has not,
strangely enough, been the focus of either the states in their actions
against the EPA, or the courts which have ruled on these actions. The
primary barriers to relief from interstate air pollution hinge on the language of the interstate provisions, the judicial interpretation of these provisions, and the scientific debate over methods of pollution source
identification.
A.

The InterrelationshipBetween Section 110 and Section 126

In addition to section 110(a)(2)(E), which directly addresses interstate pollution, section 110 also requires states to develop and submit a
SIP to the EPA in order to enforce national air quality standards. These
required SIPs are the primary method for regulating national air pollution, since the scheme under the Clean Air Act is based on local control. 50 The EPA approval of a new or revised SIP has generated
substantial controversy with respect to the interstate pollution problem.
Affected states argue that when a section 126 interstate pollution abatement action is underway, the EPA should stay approval of a polluting
state's SIP under section 110, pending the outcome of the section 126
action. 5 ' Such a procedure could prevent the approval of a less stringent
SIP if the state were held in violation of section 126.
To date, neither the courts nor the EPA has been receptive to the
dual construction of sections 110 and 126. For example, in Connecticut
v. EPA,52 the Second Circuit held that the EPA was not required to con49. There are currently no NAAQSs for sulfuric acid (H 2SO 4) and nitric acid (HNO,) which
are the immediate contributors to acid rain.
50. Although the Administrator must give final approval of a SIP, the state drafts the document and chooses which methods and controls to use in order to meet the national air quality standards. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
51. New York v. EPA (New York 1), 710 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983); Connecticut v. EPA
(Connecticut Fund I), 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982); Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.
1981).
52, 656 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
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elude section 126 proceedings before approving a SIP revision. 53 Connecticut, the affected state, argued that since section 1 10(a)(2)(E)(ii)
requires a SIP to contain provisions ensuring compliance with section
126, the outcome of an action concerning a possible violation of section
126 is a prerequisite to.approval of a SIP revision.5 4 Indeed, section
110(a)(2)(E)(ii) states that the Administrator shall approve a SIP or a
SIP revision if he has determined that "it contains adequate provisions
. .(ii) insuring compliance with the requirements of section 7426 [126]
of this title, relating to interstate pollution abatement." ' 5 The court,
however, rejected Connecticut's construction of the statute, and concluded that section 126 was designed primarily as a means for resolving
interstate pollution disputes when a SIP was not being revised. 56 Such an
interpretation, stated the court, would allow state officials effectively to
control the Administrator's actions since section 126 directs the Administrator to make his determination within a given time period. 57 The
court further reasoned that the substantive inquiry in section 110 and
section 126 proceedings was the same, and therefore, the argument that
one proceeding must be completed as a prerequisite to the other did not
58
make sense.
The following year, the Second Circuit reinforced this interpretation
of the relationship between section 110 and section 126 proceedings in
Connecticut Fund ,59 another suit by Connecticut challenging an EPA
*

53. Id. at 907.
54. Id. at 906-07.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E)(ii).
56. Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d at 907. The court stated:
When § 1 10(a)(2)(E)(ii) requires an [sic] SIP to insure compliance with § 126, it clearly
refers to subsection (a) only and not to the petition procedure set forth in subsection (b).
Subsection (a) of § 126 is really an extension of § I10(a)(2) in that it describes further
pollution-control measures which must be present in every SIP. It is thus altogether natural that § 1 10(a)(2)(E) would incorporate it by reference.
Id.
57. Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d at 907. The court's demeanor is reflected in the following
excerpt from the opinion: "[Section] 126 ... directs the EPA Administrator to hold a hearing and
make a determination within a given time period. Since state officials obviously cannot control the
Administrator's actions, it defies logic to require the state's implementation plan to insure that EPA
comply with the statutory procedure." Id.
58. Id. In explaining its decision, the court stated it was not holding that it would never be
proper to consolidate a § 126 petition with a § 110 SIP revision application. The court agreed that
such a consolidation would save considerable time. However, the court did not extend this observation to its holding by stating: "we merely conclude that EPA's failure to conclude § 126(b) proceedings prior to its approval of New York's SIP revision does not constitute grounds for vacating that
approval." Id. at 908.
59. Connecticut Fund 1, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982). Two companion cases were decided with
Connecticut Fund I: Connecticut v. EPA (Connecticut Fund 11), 696 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that with respect to in-state pollution a state does not have to consider the contribution that one
NAAQS regulated pollutant makes to the levels of another NAAQS regulated pollutant when it
determines whether the second pollutant exceeds its standard); Connecticut v. EPA (Connecticut
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action. In this case, Connecticut sought review of an EPA rule which
6°
allowed New York to continue burning 2.8% sulfur content fuel.
Again, the court upheld the EPA's approval of New York's SIP revision
without responding to Connecticut's section 126 petition alleging violation of interstate pollution provisions. 6 1 The court concluded that the
agency's inaction regarding the section 126 petition provided no basis for
overturning the EPA's decision to approve the New York SIP revision in
light of the court's previous decision in Connecticut v. EPA62 discussed
63
above.
The Sixth Circuit also adopted this interpretation in New York v.
EPA (New York 1).64 In this case, Tennessee submitted a proposed revision to its SIP, and New York, a downwind state, opposed the revision
alleging that section 110 and section 126 were being violated. 65 The EPA
approved Tennessee's SIP revision under section 110, but stated that it
would consider New York's comments when making a separate determination under section 126.66 The court denied New York's petition for
review, reasoning that approval of the Tennessee SIP revision was not
67
contingent upon completion of the section 126 proceedings.
Recently, in New York v. EPA (New York III),6 the Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the petitioner's argument that section 126 imposes an affirmative duty, under section
110(a)(2), to review existing SIPs to determine whether they adequately
protect against impermissible interstate impacts. 69 The court noted that
Fund III), 696 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1982) (sustaining an EPA-approved "trade" of higher pollution
'levels allowed in a SIP for a reduction in energy production).
60. The use of fuel or coal containing sulfur is the primary source of SO, emissions. The higher
the sulfur content in the fuel, the greater the emissions of SO,.

61.

Connecticut Fund I, 696 F.2d at 168.

62. 656 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1981).

63. Connecticut Fund I, 696 F.2d at 168. The court found that the EPA's decision to approve
New York's SIP revision was made after full consideration of the effects on Connecticut. Id. "ne
court qualified its holding, however, by stating that the decision was a narrow one that applied only

to the particular circumstances presented in that case. The court specifically refused to commend or
even condone the Agency's actions, and held only that the Agency did not abuse its discretion in
approving New York's SIP. Id.
64. 710 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983). The short forms New York I, New York II, and New York
III are not widely recognized and have been assigned to the cases by the author for this Note only.
The roman numerals following the case names designate the chronological order of the cases.
65. Id. at 1201.
66. Id. at 1202.
67. Id. at 1205. The court distinguished the two proceedings stating that the EPA had made a
"basic administrative decision" to treat each proceeding separately because the § 110 action related
to a single emission source whereas the § 126 action was directed at 17 different sources. Id. at 120405.
68. 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988). New York II is first discussed infra at notes 80-82 and
accompanying text.
69. Id. at 578.
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section 126 contained no language expressly directing the Administrator
to reevaluate existing SIPs, and if Congress had intended such action it
70
would have said so.
Although both section 110 and section 126 make reference to each
other, the courts have treated actions under the two statutes as separate
proceedings which do not bear upon one another. A more effective interpretation of the two statutes would recognize that section 110 and section
126 are in fact interrelated. Because section 126 requires states to petition for a finding of violation under section 110, and because a SIP under
section 110 must contain interstate pollution control mechanisms, claims
involving both statutes should be consolidated. Such a consolidation
would ensure that the remedy of SIP revision is indeed available for those
suing under section 126.71 As it stands, the current judicial and administrative interpretation of the statutes as separate entities drastically impairs effective interstate pollution abatement.
B.

Protection of a Margin for Growth for "Clean" Air Areas

Perhaps the weakest part of the existing interstate pollution statutes
involves section 126 coverage concerning the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) standards. 72 The PSD program limits the allowable
degradation of air quality for a given pollutant but only in areas where
the NAAQS for that pollutant is already being met.73 The statute allows
"increments" of deterioration beyond the "baseline" level of air quality
which exists in the area. 74 This baseline is established when the first PSD
permit application is filed for an area. Under this plan, a "margin for
growth" is supposed to be established to allow additional emissions from
new or modified sources until they consume the "increment" allowed in
70. Id. The court listed other situations where Congress had expressly directed the Administrator to act, and concluded that, "[a]gainst that backdrop, Congress' silence in § 110(a)(2)(E) is
significant." Id. at 579.
71. The other remedies provided for in the statute, which allow construction of a new source to
be halted and the emissions of an existing source to be stopped if either is found to be in violation of
§ 110(a)(2)(E)(i), are also hindered. However, the failure of these remedies is due more to problems
of source identification. See infra notes 103-36 and accompanying text.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1977).
73. "[E]ach applicable implementation plan shall contain emission limitations and such other
measures as may be necessary... to prevent significant deterioration of air quality in each region (or
portion thereof) identified pursuant to section 7407(d)(l)(D) or (E) of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 7471.
The areas referred to in § 7407(d)(l)(D) or (E) are those which cannot be classified under other
subparagraphs which refer to areas which do not meet the NAAQS for ambient air quality levels for
sulfur oxides or particulate matter or have ambient air quality levels better than the national standard. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7473. The statute specifically refers to sulfur dioxide and total suspended particulates (TSPs) because they are emitted in great quantities.
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their area. 75 The problem with this plan is that the PSD provisions do
not apply until a permit has been filed, and the statute does not require a
state to file a permit. Since the establishment of a baseline is contingent
upon obtaining a permit, and because allowable increments cannot be
calculated without a baseline, a state that still has a margin for growth
before reaching the ambient level can be polluted by a neighboring state
up to the point where the affected state exceeds the ambient, thereby
using up the affected state's margin for growth.
This apparent loophole in the interstate pollution regulations has
been upheld in three circuits. 76 In Connecticut Fund

,77 the

Second Cir-

cuit held that because Connecticut (an affected state) had not attained
the NAAQS for a certain pollutant, the PSD program did not apply to
that pollutant. 78 The court explained that the PSD program "establishes

an elaborate scheme requiring states to safeguard the air quality of the
'79
areas where the NAAQSs have already been attained.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in New York v. EPA (New York 11)80
held that if a baseline for a particular pollutant has not been established,
there is no duty to conduct a PSD analysis.8 Explaining its decision, the
court stated that "logic dictates that increments over the baseline concentration cannot be calculated before the baseline concentrations themselves have been calculated. '8 2 Most recently, in Air Pollution Control
District v. EPA,83 the Sixth Circuit upheld the EPA's determination that
the Clean Air Act does not protect future margins of growth.8 4 Noting
75. Id. The term "margin for growth" refers to the allowable increase in emissions from new
and modified industry which will still allow the area to remain within the NAAQSs.
76. Air Pollution Cont. Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984); New York v. EPA (New
York 11), 716 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983); Connecticut Fund I, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982).
77. 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 166.
79. Id. (emphasis added). However, after explaining this statutory scheme, the court expressed
difficulty with its application in certain situations:
[A] situation could arise where, because of the absence of a baseline in one state, a nearby
state could continue to export pollution until the affected state's concentrations of a specific
pollutant reached the NAAQSs. Thereafter, if a baseline were set, the affected state would

be unable to permit additional pollution within its own PSD increment because any further
additions to S02 concentrations would violate the NAAQSs. The PSD increment in effect
would have been consumed by the nearby state.
Id. at 167. The recognition of this dilemma, however, did not keep the court from holding for the
EPA. The court explained that it did not need to accept the Agency's rationale in order to conclude
that the EPA did not abuse its discretion. Id.
80. 716 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983).
81. Id. at 445.
82. Id. The court noted that New York had not cited even one case which required a PSD
analysis in the absence of a permit application which triggers calculation of the baseline. Id.
83. 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 1088. "[W]e decline to disturb the EPA's holding that the Clean Air Act does not
require an upwind state to alter an otherwise valid SIP solely because a downwind state that has yet
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that the EPA had relied on the Second Circuit's reasoning in Connecticut
v. EPA, the court stressed the need for national uniformity in judicial
interpretation, especially in an interstate context.85 In view of these decisions, it is clear that if the interstate pollution regulations work at all,
they work only for states with "dirty" air and do not provide any protec86
tion from out-of-state pollution for states with "clean" air.
C.

The Requirement of "Significant Contribution"

Neither section 110 nor section 126 clearly defines when the interstate pollution abatement provisions are triggered. In other words, it is
unclear what amount of pollution is deemed by the EPA to "prevent
attainment or maintenance" of the NAAQS in another state. Section 126
requires new or modified sources "which may significantly contribute to
levels of air pollution in excess of the national ambient air quality standards in any air quality control region outside the State... to provide
written notice to all nearby States . . . which may be affected by such
87
source."
Several courts have attempted to clarify the statutory language of
section 126. In Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,8 8 decided nearly two years
after the promulgation of section 126, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that section 126 was a vehicle for abating
"substantial" interstate air pollution, 9 and did not address the "significantly contribute" language of the statute. Three years later in Connecticut Fund 1,90 the Second Circuit declined to adopt the "significantly
contribute" standard pronounced in the statute, expressing difficulty
with formulating such a simple test for determining when a state actually
prevents the attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS in another
state. 9 ' The court held only that "where the impact upon a nearby state
of another state's revision of its SIP is shown by the Agency to be so
insignificant as to be fairly described as minimal, the EPA may approve
that revision even where the affected state is not in compliance with the
to comply with the NAAQSs has requested such an alteration to protect an asserted margin for
growth." Id.
85. Id.
86. While one can argue that this situation may encourage clean air states to file promptly, the

continuing problems with interstate causation render this solution ineffective. See infra notes 103-36
and accompanying text.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(a) (emphasis added).

88.
89.
90.
91.

636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Id. at 366.
696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 164-65.
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' '9 2

The approach adopted by the Second Circuit in Connecticut Fund I
has also been used by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. In New York 93
the Sixth Circuit upheld the EPA's approval of a Tennessee SIP revision,
based on the
EPA's conclusion that the long-range effects would be
' 94
"minimal."

Although the court quoted the portion of section 126 that

imposes a duty on sources which "significantly contribute" to pollution
in other states, it accepted the EPA's "minimal" standard without further discussion. Similarly, in New York I, 95 the Seventh Circuit upheld
an Illinois SIP revision because the EPA provided strong evidence suggesting that "any long-range effects would be insignificant."' 96 Again, the
court did not address the specific terms of section 126 and simply accepted the EPA's standard of "insignificance."
In 1984, however, the Sixth Circuit became the first circuit actually
to adopt the "significantly contribute" language of section 126. In Air
Pollution Control District v. EPA ,97 the court upheld a finding by the
EPA that an Indiana power station did not "substantially contribute" to
NAAQS violations in Kentucky. 9 The court went further, however, and
engaged in its own analysis of the congressional intent behind section
126. The court stated, "we believe that the test probably intended by
Congress is whether one state 'significantly contributes' to NAAQS violations in another .state."99
Recently, in New York III,1 0 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia applied the "significant contribution" standard in a combined action by Pennsylvania, Maine, and New York. The court upheld
the EPA's determination that more than eighty percent of the SO2 con92. Id. at 165 (emphasis added). There has been considerable debate on whether this case in
fact established a "minimal impact" standard. However, most courts have declined to adopt such an
interpretation of the case. See, e.g., Air Pollution Cont. Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1092 (6th Cir.
1984).
93. 710 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
94. Id. at 1204.
95. 716 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 444 (emphasis added). This evidence was not the sole reason that the court upheld
the SIP revision. Other factors the court considered were the immediate impact of increased emissions on air quality and the current lack of adequate technology to measure long-range effects. Id.
97. 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984).
98. Id. at 1093. The court added that its role in reviewing the EPA's determinations was limited, and stated that "[i]f there is a rational basis for the EPA's determination, we must uphold it."
Id. at 1083.
99. Id. at 1093. In part, the court based its assessment of congressional intent upon an analysis
of hearings before the House of Representatives on the interstate pollution problem. Id. at 1091
(citing H.R. REP.No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 329, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1077, 1408) (emphasis added).
100. 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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tributing to the violation came from Pennsylvania sources, and therefore
"out-of-state" sources did not amount to a significant contribution. 0 1
Although the "significantly contribute" language of section 126 has
finally been adopted by at least two circuits, it is still not clear what
amount of pollution is considered to be "significant." There are no subsequent cases that have tried to define the term. Presumably, the adoption of the statutory language by the court above was to aid in
determining when section 126 provisions are triggered. However, in
light of the fact that section 126 has never been successfully used against
another state to prevent interstate pollution abatement, it is clear that the
statute needs more definition, either by the courts or a statutory
amendment.
It remains to be seen, however, whether a state that is being "significantly" affected by out-of-state pollution would really be helped by a better defined "significant contribution" standard. It is often the case that
several sources of pollution within a state, though each may be minimal,
consolidate to have a significant effect. 10 2 The statute, however, only applies to significant contributions from single sources. Thus, although a
particular region within a state could be identified as significantly contributing to air pollution in another state, the statute would not apply to
the region. In sum, the validity of a significant contribution test is dependent, in part, upon the ability of the affected state effectively to pinpoint
the source of the pollution. The means by which a source can be pinpointed have been limited, however, by science, the EPA, and the courts.
D. Problems with Causation
One of the greatest difficulties involved in the problem of interstate
pollution is the determination of the source or cause of the pollution. In
recent years, mathematical and meteorological computer models have
been developed to try to estimate the probable location of a pollution
source through computer simulation of natural conditions. The validity
of modeling analysis, however, is currently under debate. A short-range
model (CRSTER) which allows tracking of pollutants from a single
source is widely used.10 3 CRSTER estimates the impact of pollution by
measuring emission levels from a single source and then calculating the
effect of these emissions at various destinations using factors such as
wind velocity and direction. 1° 4
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 580.
See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
Annotation, Interstate Air Pollution, 92 A.L.R. FED. 316, 335 (1988).
Id. The model attempts to measure the effects by comparing the actual contributions of
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Long-range transport, however, is the basis of the interstate pollution problem. Studies have shown that air pollutants are often carried
through the atmosphere for thousands of miles, especially when sources
use tall stacks to minimize local air quality effects.10 5 Several types of
models designed to track long-range transport exist.10 6 As early as 1981,
a report from the United States-Canadian Working Group on Atmospheric Modeling listed five long-range transport models which gave uniform results and were particularly accurate in the assessment of regionto-region impacts. 10 7 More recently, at a 1986 international conference
on acid rain, long-range trajectory models were found to "give representative estimates of the long-range transboundary transmission of air
pollutants." 0 8
The Reagan EPA administration, however, recognized modeling results only for a range of fifty kilometers.10 9 The courts have deferred to
emissions NOx and S02 to concentrations of these compounds and their resulting acid in areas
within the range of the model.
105. Wetstone, supra note 24, at 50,001-02. By emitting pollutants higher into the atmosphere,
tall stacks allow wide dispersal of pollutants and help alleviate concentration of pollution in specific
geographic areas with heavy industry. They were originally adopted by industry as a pollution control method that allowed them to achieve greater emissions and yet remain within the ambient standards. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 11, at 214. This method of
pollution "control" has been rejected by the courts which favor actual emission reductions. See,
e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
106. See D. Balsillie, Long-Range-TransportComputer Modeling: Where Are We Now?, in ACID
RAIN: ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS, REGULATORY ASPECTS 1-22-37 (R. Schwieger & T. Elliott eds.
1985); MODELING OF TOTAL ACID PRECIPITATION IMPACTS 1, 25, 155, 205 (J. Schnoor ed. 1984).

The total number of models actually exceeds 100 although many of these models are similar and
exhibit only minor differences. See Thomson, Angle & Sakiyama, Selecting Air Quality-Acid Deposition Modelsfor Mesoscale Application, 37 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL A. 260 (1987), for a com-

plete list of these models and their status.
The typical factors taken into account by a long-range model are wind speed, temperature,
boundary layer depth, emission strength, deposition velocity, oxidant concentration, and scavenging
rate. Derwent, Treating Uncertainty in Models of the Atmospheric Chemistry of Nitrogen Compounds, 21 ATMOSPHERIC ENV'T 1445 (1987). Long-range models are divided into two main categories: Lagrangian and Eulerian. Lagrangian models follow emissions from a source or group of
sources downwind, and provide estimates of the contributions of those sources at various points
along the path of air. Models of this type do not require large computer systems and their results are
generally easy to interpret. Samson, Simulating Source-Receptor Relationshipsfor Atmospheric Contaminants, in ACID RAIN: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOURCES AND RECEPTORS 129 (J. White

ed. 1988). In contrast, Eulerian models are much more complex and employ a greater number of
chemical and physical processes, and require extensive computer systems as well as many hours of
interpretation. Id.
107. Ostrov, InterboundaryStationarySource Pollution-CleanAir Act Section 126 and Beyond,
8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 37, 55-56 (1982).
108. Pressman, Galperin & Mikhailova, Trajectory Models of the Long-Range Air Pollutant
Transmission, in ACIDIFICATION AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS 281, 289 (T. Schneider ed. 1986).
Other scientists, however, dispute the accuracy of the models currently available because of their
inability to project detailed relations between emissions and the resulting deposition. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, Acid Deposition: Unraveling a Regional Phenomenon, 243 SCIENCE 753 (1989).
109. See 49 Fed. Reg. 34,863-64 (1984).
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the EPA's 50K standard, and parties who have suggested the use of longrange models have thus far been unsuccessful in the courts. In Connecticut Fund 1,110 Connecticut challenged the EPA's use of the CRSTER
model, claiming it was inadequate to measure the complex air patterns
between New York and Connecticut."I' The court upheld the EPA's use
of the short-range model over the long-range model presented by Connecticut, stating that Connecticut failed to demonstrate that the EPA's
carefully considered decision constituted an abuse of the Agency's
discretion. "1

2

The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have also upheld the EPA's reliance
on short-range models. In New York 1, 113 the Sixth Circuit held that the
EPA did not abuse its discretion in relying on models which were valid
only to a distance of fifty kilometers.' 14 In explaining the judicial approach for review of agency actions, the court held that "courts must,
and do, defer to EPA on technical decisions involved in enforcement of
the Clean Air Act. Its choice of reference models will not be overturned
by a reviewing court so long as the EPA's own guidelines are followed."1 5 One year later, in Air Pollution ControlDistrict v. EPA,' 16 the
Sixth Circuit again rejected a challenge to the EPA's reliance on shortrange models.1 17 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in New York 11,118 held
that the EPA had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting longrange models proposed by New York. 19
110. 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982).
111. Id. at 158-59. One problem with the CRSTER model that the petitioners pointed out was
the phenomenon of "fumigation," which occurs when the plume carrying the emissions from the
source "comes into contact with a turbulent internal boundary layer of air (TIBL) created by the
temperature differential between warm air over coastal lands and cooler air carried in from the
water. The TIBL erodes the plume causing the emissions to disperse over the land mass resulting in
higher pollution concentrations at ground level." Id. at 158. The petitioners wanted the EPA to use
the "Valley Model" which "relies on assumed meteorological conditions rather than actual data,"
and which takes the fumigation problem into account. Id. at n.26.
112. Id. at 159. In explaining its decision, the court stated that the EPA had "adjusted the
CRSTER model to account for the terrain complexity in Connecticut and provided a detailed technical rationale for the inadequacy of other proposed models." Id.
113. 710 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
114. Id. at 1204.
115. Id. The court reasoned further that the possible existence of other "unevaluated predictive
devices" which could determine interstate effects more precisely than the limited modeling used by
the TVA did not mean that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it based its analysis on
TVA's data. Id.
116. 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984).
117. Id. at 1084. In explaining its decision, the court stated that the EPA had a "rational basis"
for choosing the factors used in the modeling study. Further, the court noted that the EPA had even
run an additional modeling study using four of the five factors submitted by Jefferson County, and
thus the EPA decision was "neither arbitrary nor capricious." Id.
118. 716 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983).
119. Id. at 444. In explaining its decision, the court stated:
The EPA chose to use a short-range model rather than one of the modeling techniques
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Recently, in New York 111,120 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia confirmed that the acceptance or rejection of a particular air
pollution model was a matter of interpretation of scientific evidence and
thus, the EPA's rejection of a particular model should not be interfered
with by the courts. 121 In that case, Pennsylvania, one of the affected
states, relied on a modeling study commissioned by the EPA, which purported to predict violations of the SO 2 standard along the Virginia-Ohio
border. 122 While noting that the study in fact predicted these violations,
the court deferred to the EPA's rejection of the study based on the fact
that the author of the study conceded that additional work was needed
23
before firm results could be obtained.
Although these cases were decided from 1982 through 1988, the
models relied on by the plaintiffs do not reflect the type of models currently available but rather reflect the models available at the time the
suits werefiled. None of these cases have dealt with a recent long-range
model. In the few years which have elapsed since the filing of New York
III, new long-range modeling techniques have been supported by a portion of the scientific community. 124 Although long-range models have
not been uniformly accepted, it would seem that the advancement of
technology is such that the EPA will not be able to continue to rely solely
on short-range models and remain credible.
In any event, since the courts have adopted a "significant contribution" test to trigger section 126, the use of long-range models under the
current state of the law will probably not solve the causation problem.
To illustrate this point, even if a long-range model can pinpoint a particpreferred by New York because it concluded that despite its limited scope the short-range
model was most reliable....
New York is asking this court to substitute New York's technical judgement for that
of the Agency; we do not have that authority. We must defer to the EPA's choice of
reference models if that choice conforms to Agency guidelines .... [The guidelines] do not
mandate the use of any particular model.
Id.
120. 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
121. Id. at 580.
122. Id.
123. Id. In the concurring opinion, Judge Ruth Ginsburg noted the court's awareness of the
inability of §§ 110 and 126 to regulate the interstate pollution problem effectively:
[T]he EPA has taken no action against sources of interstate air pollution under either
§ 126(b) or § 1l0(a)(2)(E) in the decade-plus since those provisions were enacted. Congress, when it is so minded, is fully capable of instructing the EPA to address particular
matters promptly.... Congress did not supply such direction in this instance; instead, it
allowed and has left unchecked the EPA's current approach to interstate air pollution.
The judiciary, therefore, is not the proper place in which to urge alteration of the Agency's
course.
Id. at 581 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
124. See supra notes 106-08.
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ular source, this source, in and of itself, may not "significantly contribute" to interstate pollution. The problem that several "insignificant"
sources can combine to create a "significant" effect in another state still
remains. This conclusion does not minimize the value of long-range
modeling analysis, however. Such an analysis would still be needed to
identify polluters under an amended statutory scheme which covered aggregate sources as well as single "significant" contributors.
Under the current structure of the statutes, neither section 110 nor
section 126 addresses the problem of aggregate source pollution, a fact
that courts have acknowledged. In Connecticut v. EPA, 125 the court concluded that "[flor purposes of a [SIP] revision application under section
110(a)(3)(A), 'the proper inquiry is directed to the emissions of a particular source of pollution.' "126 Agreeing with this interpretation of the statute, the court in New York 1,127 stated that the proper forum for an
inquiry on the aggregate impact of several sources is a section 126 proceeding. 1 2 8 Section 126, however, does not refer to a remedy for aggregate source pollution but rather addresses the significant contribution of
a single source. The problem with an absence of an aggregate source
remedy was demonstrated in Air Pollution Control District v. EPA. 129 In
that case, the EPA actually identified numerous sources that contributed
to the interstate air pollution in Kentucky. 30 However, because section
126 requires action against an individual source, the EPA's finding that
the specific Indiana plant being sued did not "substantially contribute" to
Kentucky air pollution13' left Kentucky without a remedy.
Another recent case involving interstate air pollution has further
contributed to the causation problem. In Thomas v. New York, 32 the
then current EPA Administrator, Costle, sent formal notification letters
to the Secretary of State in which he concluded that "acid deposition is
125. 656 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
126. Id. at 909 (quoting Ohio Envtl. Council v. EPA, 593 F.2d 24, 30 (6th Cir. 1979)). Simi-

larly, in Connecticut Fund 1,696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982), the court concluded that the EPA was not
required to consider the cumulative impact of all New York sources on Connecticut when approving
a SIP revision. Id. at 168.
127. 710 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
128. Id. at 1205.
129. 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984).
130. Id. at 1077.
131. Id. at 1093-94. The EPA found that the Indiana plant contributed only about three percent
of the pollutants in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Id. at 1093. In supporting the EPA's decision, the
court reasserted its deferential posture: "We are convinced that the broad deference which we are
statutorily required to accord to the findings of the Agency preclude our disturbing the EPA's determination, at least absent any other criteria established by the EPA, or found elsewhere in the Act,
that would require a different result." Id.
132. 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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endangering public welfare in the U.S. and Canada and . . . U.S. and
Canadian sources contribute to the problem not only in the country
where they are located but also in the neighboring country."' 13 3 Subsequently, Costle was replaced by Thomas when the Reagan Administration took office, and the new EPA did not interpret Costle's letters to
imply a requirement for action. 134 As a result, several eastern states, national environmental groups, and others brought suit arguing that
Costle's letters imposed a duty upon the current EPA Administrator to
identify the states that contributed to the acid deposition and to require
those states to revise their SIPs.135 The Thomas court held that because

the findings in Costle's letters were not published pursuant to notice and
comment procedures, no duty was imposed upon the current EPA to act
36
on the findings.'
Thus far, the combination of the "significant contribution" test, the
lack of statutory language concerning aggregate sources, and the reluctance of the judiciary to force the current EPA to act on the information
that it possesses has left states affected by numerous sources without an
effective avenue of relief. Therefore, states in this predicament cannot
currently rely on sections 110 or 126 of the Clean Air Act for redress;
they must look to other remedies.
III.

ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT

A.

Citizen Suits

The EPA's reluctance to enforce the federal environmental statutes,
led Congress to enact citizen suit provisions in each of the environmental
statutes. 137 Citizen suits were to provide an alternative remedy when the
133. Id. at 1445 (emphasis added). Costle's formal notification letters were required under § 115
of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415, which states that the Administrator must notify the governor of the state which has been found to cause or contribute to air pollution in a foreign country.
The notification forces the state to revise as much of its SIP as was "inadequate to prevent or eliminate the endangerment." Id. Costle's letter was based on a report by the International Joint Commission. Id.
134. Id. at 1445.

135. Id. at 1445-46.
136. Id. at 1447. One of the primary reasons given by the Reagan Administration for inaction
on the acid rain issue, both at the interstate and international level, is the length of time required to
complete detailed acid deposition studies. By allowing the incoming EPA to disregard the findings
of the Costle study, the considerable research that was done by the International Joint Commission
has not been utilized. This inaction can be interpreted, at the very least, as a setback for the control
of acid deposition and thus for interstate air pollution. In addition, the fact that notice and comment
procedures were not fulfilled does not justify the disregard by the EPA of the study itself. The
Reagan Administration countered that it must make its own studies.
137. J. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL
LAWS 4 (1987). Citizen suit provisions were enacted in order to provide a goad to government
enforcement. If the goad failed, the citizen suit would then serve as the enforcement mechanism. Id.
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government failed to enforce the statutes adequately. 3 The first citizen
suit provision came in 1970 in section 304 of the Clean Air Act. 39 Section 304 provides in part that "any person may commence a civil action
on his own behalf-(1) against any person (including (i) the United
States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency... (2)
against the Administrator ...or (3) against any person who proposes to
construct or constructs any new or modified major emitting facility without a permit."' 14 Although section 304 gives a "person" the right to
bring a citizen suit, section 302 defines "persons" as individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, states, municipalities, and subdivisions
of states. 141
On its face, the statute appears to give a "person" great enforcement
power. However, citizen suits are limited in four major ways, in part, to
alleviate the potential for abuse. First, the statute only allows citizens to
sue after giving the appropriate federal agency the opportunity to sue
first.142 Second, damages payable to the citizen are not available as a
remedy under a citizen suit,

43

rather, injunctive relief is the primary

44

Third, the recently narrowed injury-in-fact requirement for
remedy.
citizens' standing to sue on environmental matters has provided a constitutional barrier to the instigation of many citizen suits.'

45

Fourth, the

138. Id.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
140. Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b). A 60-day notice requirement is also included in the statute which
forbids instigation of an action until 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice to the violator or the
EPA Administrator. Id.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d). Section 304 does not address the specific remedies available to citizen
enforcers. The statute only allows for attorneys' fees to be awarded when "appropriate" and, in the
case of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, for bonds to be posted. Id. Damages are not recoverable for injury to the person or property. Glicksman, FederalPreemption and
PrivateLegal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 121, 141 (1985).
144. J. MILLER, supra note 137, at 73. The content and standards for injunctions do not depend
on whether the enforcer is a private citizen or a government enforcement agency. Id. This ensures
that if a citizen suit is won, the remedy is equal to one which the government agency would have
obtained had it sued instead. Id. at 74. For example, in Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 847 F.2d
1109 (4th Cir. 1988), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $977,000 civil penalty in a
citizen suit. The court stated that the penalty imposed was causally connected to the citizen plaintiff's injury, even if the penalty was only payable to the United States. Id. at 1113. For an extensive
discussion of the various types of injunctions which may be obtained in a citizen suit, see J. MILLER,
supra note 137, at 74-83.
An outgrowth of limiting relief to injunctions is the requirement that citizens must make a
good-faith allegation that violations of an environmental law are ongoing; complaints will be dismissed which allege only past violations. Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
108 S.Ct. 376 (1987). Although the Gwaltney case involved violations under the Clean Water Act, a
federal district court held the Gwaltney standard equally applicable to citizen suits under the Clean
Air Act. Moran v. Vaccaro, 684 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
145. It has been argued that the injury-in-fact element of standing is not relevant under the
citizen suit provisions because Congress has given private citizens enforcement powers to act for the
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fact that a plaintiff can prove a statutory violation does not automatically
ensure injunctive relief. 146
These limitations do not, however, render the citizen suit useless to
enforce the interstate pollution statutes. Once the government agency
has been given the opportunity to sue and does not, a "person" is free to
sue provided she meets the difficult standing requirements. 14 7 In addition, although damages cannot be obtained in such a suit, the primary
reason for the suit is to stop the polluting activity. Thus, an injunction
serves as a meaningful remedy. However, since injunctions are very difficult to obtain, 148 the suit may ultimately prove fruitless. In the final
reckoning, the difficulties involved in bringing and winning a citizen suit
greatly diminish their apparent usefulness.
In recent years the number of citizen suits has increased markedly,
corresponding with a large decline in federal enforcement. 149 This increase is due primarily to the enforcement efforts of the National Resources Defense Council and other national and regional environmental
groups. 150 The success and number of these suits in relation to the interstate pollution problem remains to be seen, however. Citizen suit plaintiffs are confronted with the same obstacles of causation and undefined
statutory language which has rendered every interstate pollution suit to
date unsuccessful.

15'

EPA as "private attorneys general." J. MILLER, supra note 137, at 24. However, recent Supreme
Court decisions have narrowed the injury-in-fact element of standing, requiring the suing party to
show an actual or threatened injury which is redressable by the court. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982);
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). These narrowed requirements
have indeed affected environmental litigation. See Glover River Org. v. Department of the Interior,
675 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1982) (group challenging absence of filing of an environmental impact statement held to have alleged sufficient concrete injury but had not shown an available redress); Coughlin v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 27 Wash. App. 888, 621 P.2d 183 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (plaintiff
challenging absence of filing an environmental impact statement held not to have standing in her
capacity as a concerned and active citizen, taxpayer and resident of the area because the harm was
too remote).
146. In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), the Court stated that an injunction
should only be issued where it "is essential in order effectually to protect property rights against
injuries otherwise irremediable." Id. at 312 (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456
(1919)). Although Weinberger involved the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) and not
the Clean Air Act (CAA), both statutes contain the same type of private and governmental enforcement and it is likely that the standard for granting injunctions under the FWPCA would be mirrored
in a CAA case.
In addition to the four limitations on citizen suits discussed in the text, the eleventh amendment
of the Constitution also limits the parties that a citizen can sue. A suit may not be "commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
147. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 146.
149. J. MILLER, supra note 137, at 12.
150. Id. at It.
151. See supra notes 87-136 and accompanying text.
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B.

Federal Common Law Nuisance Actions

The law of nuisance concerns the right of an individual to be free
52
from unreasonable interference with the care or enjoyment of his land. 1
Before the passage of the major federal environmental statutes in the
1970s, federal nuisance law was the main body of law that governed pollution problems.15 3 Today it is viewed by many as the common law basis
54
for modern environmental law. 1
In 1938, the recognition of federal common law by the courts was
profoundly affected by the landmark case of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins 155 which held that there is "no federal general common
law." ' 56 Despite the far-reaching ramifications of this holding, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have interpreted Erie as recognizing the
existence of a federal common law in interstate controversies where existing law could not resolve the situation. 157 However, such cases were
decided before the enactment of federal statutes governing interstate
pollution.
Following the passage of federal law governing interstate pollution
disputes,15 8 the Supreme Court held in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 11),159 that the federal common law of nuisance had been preempted in interstate pollution disputes by provisions in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).'6° Although Milwaukee II involved water rather than air pollution, the Supreme Court would likely
apply a similar preemption standard in an air pollution case since the
Court stated that most forms of interstate air pollution fall within the
152. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK, & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 414
(1984).
153. Wetstone, supra note 39, at 14.
154. Id.
155. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
156. Id. at 78.
157. See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I1), 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 589 (1945).
158. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(E) & 7426 (1977); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1981).
159. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). This case is commonly known as Milwaukee 11 because of the previous case involving the same parties, Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The
Milwaukee I court held unanimously that Illinois had the right to bring a federal common law
nuisance action against Wisconsin for allegedly discharging raw sewage into Lake Michigan, thereby
creating a public nuisance for Illinois citizens. Id. at 104-08. However, the court in Milwaukee I
admitted that the passage of new federal law might preempt the federal common law of nuisance.
Id. at 107.
160. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 317-20. Several months after Milwaukee JI was decided, the
Court reaffirmed its conclusions regarding federal common law nuisance claims in Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), holding that "the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more
comprehensive scope of the [Federal Water Pollution Control Act]." Id. at 22.
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provisions of the Clean Air Act. 16 1
A few subsequent lower court decisions that involved interstate air
pollution employed this "preemption" rationale. In New England Legal
Foundation v. Costle,162 a federal common law nuisance claim was
brought by various nonprofit organizations, municipalities, and individuals from the state of Connecticut who alleged that sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and sulfates were being transported through the air into
Connecticut from New York and New Jersey. 163 The court held that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable relief, stating that it would not
recognize a federal common law remedy because the claim could be satisfied under a successful section 126 action. 164 Similarly, in United States
v. Kin-Buc, Inc.,165 the court held that the Clean Air Act preempted the
federal common law of nuisance. 66 The court reasoned that Congress
had already addressed the problem through a comprehensive regulatory
program. 67 Most recently, in Reeger v. Mill Services, 68 the district
court found that the regulatory schemes of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and the Clean Air Act were so similar that the same princi69
ples of preemption applied to both.
It has been argued that because the Clean Air Act only regulates
sulfur and nitrogen oxides but not the sulfates and nitrates which contribute to acid rain, there should be no real preemption problem. 70 In
New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, ' 7' the district court specifically
rejected the claim that section 126 did not cover the action brought simply because the EPA had promulgated NAAQSs only for sulfur dioxide
and not for sulfates.' 7 2 Section 126 actions, according to the court, are
not restricted to substances currently regulated by the EPA. 173 The
161.
162.
163.
brought
164.
whether

451
475
Id.
suit
Id.
the

U.S. at 326.
F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (1981).
at 427. In addition to the federal common law nuisance claim, the plaintiffs also
under § 126 of the Clean Air Act and under various constitutional provisions. Id.
at 441 & n.21, 442. On appeal, however, the court refused to address the question
Clean Air Act preempts federal common law nuisance actions in every instance. 666

F.2d at 32.

165. 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982). The case involved a claim against the Kin-Buc Landfill in
New Jersey for air and water pollution.
166. Id. at 701-03.
167. Id. at 702.

168. 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (citizen suit against operator of hazardous waste treatment and disposal facility for air and water pollution).

169. Id. at 363.
170. See Glicksman, supra note 143, at 169-71; see also Bleiweiss, Environmental Regulation and
the Federal Common Law of Nuisance: A Proposed Standard of Preemption, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 41, 67-68 (1983).
171. 475 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (1981).
172. Id. at 442 n.21.
173. Id.
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EPA, however, has subsequently concluded that section 126 procedures
74
apply only to those specific pollutants covered by the NAAQSs.
In light of these cases and administrative actions, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would uphold a federal common law nuisance action in an interstate air pollution suit, regardless of whether acid
rain is regulated. The travesty of this situation is epitomized by the statements of the courts that a successful section 126 action will accomplish
the same goal as a federal common law nuisance action. Ironically, since
there have been no successful section 126 actions to date, the result of
eliminating the federal common law nuisance action does indeed produce
the same result; the states are left without an effective remedy against
interstate pollution under either scheme.
C. Actions Under State Law
The preemption analysis applied by the courts to federal common
law nuisance actions does not automatically apply to a similar state ac177
76
tion.1 75 The limits of the commerce clause,1 the tenth amendment,
and the fifth amendment, 7 8 are at issue when determining whether a
federal law preempts a state law, 179 whereas the same concerns are not
present in the federal common law versus federal statutory law preemption analysis discussed above. In addition, the federal need for uniform1 in the application of the law involving
ity' 80
interstate disputes is also a
factor when addressing federal/state preemption concerns.
174. 49 Fed. Reg. 48,152 (1984).

175. It is possible that other common law actions besides nuisance could be brought, such as
trespass, negligence, or strict liability. However, nuisance is the most likely cause of action for interstate pollution such as acid rain because of the amorphous nature of air, as opposed to land or water.
Fischer, The Availability of Private Remedies for Acid Rain Damage, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 429, 479
(1981).
Aside from these common law actions, there are also state statutory causes of action based on
the jurisdiction of the state over its citizens or entities doing business under its laws. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1980). See, for example, the California Environmental
Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21,000-176 (West 1982), which was applied to an energy
project in Southern Utah. 58 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 614, 621 (1975). This type of action for interstate
environmental harm is very uncommon, however, because the statutes only govern the out-of-state
projects of state citizens. Lutz, Interstate Environmental Law: FederalismBordering on Neglect?, 13
Sw. U.L. REv. 573, 614 (1983). Therefore, the statutes are inapplicable to the majority of out-ofstate polluters.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
177. Id. amend. X.
178. Id. amend. V.
179. A detailed discussion of the application of these three constitutional provisions as applied to
interstate pollution disputes is beyond the scope of this Note. For a more extensive discussion, see
Glicksman, supra note 143, at 171-85.
180. "Uniformity" is not to be interpreted as meaning that Congress requires a uniform level of
environmental quality. Every state has a different environmental situation which is the main reason
environmental control primarily rests with the states. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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The main dilemma of a state common law action in an interstate
pollution dispute is the attempt by one state to apply its pollution control
laws to a polluter in another state. This application may result in discrimination towards the out-of-state polluter because the court of the affected state may be more concerned with protecting the health and
environment of its own residents than with safeguarding the out-of-state
industry.' 8' In view of this possibility, it is somewhat surprising that
Congress has not expressly preempted state common law remedies. Section 304(e)182 of the Clean Air Act, the citizen suit provision, gives
' 3 the right to sue notwithstanding
states 18
the federal statutes that cover
the action, but only in federal court. In addition, section 116184 of the
Act provides that federal law will not preempt those state laws which
impose more stringent standards than the federal law.
Similar provisions in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 8 5
however, have been interpreted by the courts to refer only "to the right
of a state with respect to discharges within that state," and not to a state's
right to impose its more stringent limitations upon polluters in other
states. 86 Again, while Federal Water Pollution Control Act decisions
are not dispositive of the outcome of a Clean Air Act case, the similarities in the two statutory schemes suggest that the result would be the
87
same. 1
In sum, there are no effective alternative remedies for enforcing an
action against an interstate air polluter. Actions under the citizen suit
provisions, the federal common law of nuisance, and state law all have
serious drawbacks which reduce their viability as enforcement mechanisms. In addition, the recent lack of judicial intervention in environ181. It has been suggested that because nuisance cases are fact-specific and involve an "amorphous balancing" of the interests of the parties involved, it would be difficult to prove that a court
had discriminated against an out-of-state polluter even if it were to occur. Glicksman, supra note
143, at 201. This "balancing" could serve to cover up the hidden discriminatory intent of a court the
ruling of which favored the industry of its state.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e).
183. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
185. Section 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1972).
186. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee III), 731 F.2d 403, 413 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) (emphasis added). See, however, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987), which affirmed that the FWPCA preempts the law of an affected state which
seeks to impose liability on a source in another state. Id. at 500.
The states which suffer the greatest harm from acid rain have enacted legislation to reduce
emissions within their own boundaries. See Roberts, Acid Rain Regulation: FederalFailure and
State Success, 8 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES 1, 35-36 (1988), for a discussion of the various state laws.
187. For an extensive discussion of why the courts should rule in favor of preserving state common law actions, see Glicksman, supra note 143, at 206-10.
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mental matters is further impairing these already faulty remedies. 188
Thus, in light of the fact that sections 110 and 126 of the Clean Air Act
have proved ineffective, coupled with the lack of viable alternatives, it is
clear that new legislation is needed.
IV.

A.

CHANGING THE CURRENT LAW

Economic and Political Considerations

Although the Clean Air Act has been amended periodically since
1977, there have been no substantive changes affecting the interstate pollution abatement provisions. This standstill is due in part to both economic and political pressures.
Further regulation of S02 emissions (a major contributor to interstate pollution and acid rain) has been resisted on a political front for
several reasons. One reason is the fact that the primary geographic
source of SO 2 is the Midwest, whereas the areas which are most affected
by acid rain are the northeastern United States and eastern Canada.18 9
Studies have shown that the emissions from power plants in Ohio are
fifty percent higher than the combined emissions of New Jersey, New
York, and all the New England states. 90 However, because of causation
problems,' 9' the midwestern states have effectively lobbied against
stricter emissions controls directed at their geographical area. 92 In addition, the western states and southern states claim that they are not contributing to New England's damage and therefore should not share the
cost of cleaning up. The western states do, however, support sulfur emission reduction because a switch to low-sulfur coal, found mostly in the
West, would boost their economy. Thus, in the words of former EPA
Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus,
If they live in the West, they say, "We want it cleaned up, but we're
not going to pay for it." If they live in New England, they say, "We
want you to quit poisoning our lakes, and the Middle West is doing it,
and therefore they ought to pay for it." If they live in the Middle
West, they say, "We don't think there's any problem, and if there is,
why should we pay for it if New England benefits?" And the South
188. Glicksman, A Retreatfrom JudicialActivism: The Seventh Circuit and the Environment, 63
CH.-KENT L. REV. 209 (1987). The recent movement towards restraint, according to Glicksman,.
has been motivated by separation of powers concerns and by the judicial conviction that activism has
not effectively confined agency discretion within statutory boundaries in the past. Id. at 250.
189. Note, Acid Rain and the Clean Air Act: Agency Inaction and the Need for Legislated Reform, 6 VA. J. NAT. REsoURCEs 213, 215, 218 (1986).
190.

F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 11, at 310.

191. See supra notes 103-36 and accompanying text.
192. See Note, supra note 189.
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says, "It's your problem and don't bother us.' 1 9 3
Economists have also contributed to the debate by speculating on
the national and regional impacts of acid rain control. One firm specializing in economic-impact and information analysis has predicted that a
stringent acid rain control program will create an annual $13.1 billion in
industry sales, $1.4 billion in corporate profits and 195,000 jobs. 194 At
the opposite extreme, other studies predict permanent damage to the
U.S. industrial economy because of increased pollution control costs and
reduced productivity. By the year 2000, states one study, cumulative
losses to the GNP would be $223 billion and 862,000 jobs would be
lost. 195 Still other studies have focused on the regional impact of acid
rain legislation, pinpointing a few states which would be markedly affected economically. 196 Further reports focus on the rate of emission reduction, claiming that too much reduction too soon would mean very
high costs to industry with resulting economic disruption. 9 7 In light of
these various economic predictions, as well as the geographical concerns,
it is clear that the disparate views regarding cost and allocation of the
burden have provided a barrier for immediate action.
Another barrier to the establishment of new regulations is the continued debate on the effects of acid rain. While environmental groups
have come forward with studies linking increased acidity to substantial
environmental damage, 9 8 other studies have been submitted which state
that the damage from acid rain is minor compared to the natural acidification which results from decaying vegetation, animal droppings, and
natural soil components. 99 The Reagan Administration took the position that more research needed to be done before any action was taken, a
position which was advocated by Lee Thomas, the EPA Administrator
at the time. Thomas has stated that the Agency's position is that a stringent acid rain control program is not necessary. 2°°
193. Regional Tensions Complicate Search for an Acid Rain Remedy, 16 NAT. J. 860 (1984).
194. Acid Rain Control Legislation Could Create $13 Billion/Year in Sales, Clean Coal/Synfuels
Newsletter, March 20, 1987, at 1.
195. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1500 (Oct. 9, 1987).
196. Id.
197. Decision to Initiate or Delay Controls on Acid Rain Unsupported by Data, The Bureau of
National Affairs Daily Report for Executives, Dec. 12, 1984, at A-8.
198. NAS Study Confirms Past Reports Linking Environmental Damage with Sulfur Dioxide, 16
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2085 (Mar. 21, 1986).
199. Id. at 2086.
200. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1549 (Oct. 16, 1987). The new EPA Administrator, William K.
Reilly, has announced that the Bush Administration will break with the "research only" stance of
the past and will soon propose a comprehensive acid rain bill. Roberts, Reilly Vows Environmental
Activism, 243 SCIENCE 731 (1989).
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B.

CongressionalAction

These economic, political, and scientific debates have all had a substantial effect on the Legislature. Congress has been caught in a dilemma over the past several years as to whether it should pass immediate
legislation to control acid rain or wait until the results of the ongoing
multimillion-dollar research programs are in, to ensure that only the responsible compounds and geographical areas are regulated. 20 On the
one hand, if Congress delays regulation for five or ten years, emissions
will remain high for at least another decade, risking further ecological
damage. Conversely, by acting immediately Congress would risk that a
control program designed today will be less cost-effective than one which
20 2
could be designed five or ten years from now.

At least a few congressmen have decided that action should be taken
now. Several acid rain bills have been drafted and submitted to Congress
in recent years but none have been passed. In 1986, acid rain bills were
introduced in both the House and the Senate. 20 3 The most prominent
bill, S. 2203, contained a comprehensive acid rain control program which
differed in several ways from previous proposals. First, the bill called for
a 12.3 million ton S02 emission reduction on a nationwide scale, and also
24
placed restrictions on HC and CO emissions from cars and trucks. 0
Second, the bill called for an emissions reduction in all fifty states,
whereas previous proposals had restricted regulation to only thirty-one
targeted states. 20 5 Third, the bill devised three separate categories of SO 2
emission limits which were dependent upon an industrial plant's capacity
to emit 502.206 Under this plan, Congress would set actual numerical
limits for stationary sources for the first time. Senate Bill 2203, however,
failed in the 99th congressional session at the subcommittee level for lack
20 7
of support before reaching either the House or Senate floors.
There were several bills drafted for the 100th Congress which addressed the subject of acid deposition. 20 8 The most prominent bill, H.R.
201. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ACID RAIN AND TRANSPORTED AIR POLLUTANTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 3-4 (1985).

202. Id.
203. The most recent bills introduced prior to 1986, H.R. 2679, and S. 283, would have required
a ten million ton reduction of SO 2 emissions.
204. S. 2203, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. S. 2203, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). A similar bill, H.R. 4567, was later introduced in the
99th session, and also failed.
208. S. 95, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Kerry); S. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(Proxmire); S. 321, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Mitchell); S. 1123, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(Durenberger); S. 1894, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Mitchell); H.R. 1664, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
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2666, suffered the same fate as its predecessor in the 99th Congress (S.
2203), because the membership of the Committee which rejected the previous bill had changed very little. 209 On October 4, 1988, Senator
George Mitchell announced he was abandoning his efforts to sponsor a
similar bill in the Senate even before the close of the 100th Congress
210
because he felt that there was no political will to carry the bill forward.
House Resolution 2666 called for a ten million ton reduction in SO 2
emissions and a four million ton reduction in NOx emission by 1997 for
stationary sources. 21' The bill used the 1980 emissions of both pollutants
as the baseline, meaning that the reductions required would really be
even larger than the stated figures since emissions have continued to
grow since 1980. The bill also set controls on NOx emissions from motor
vehicles and the sulfur content in diesel fuel. In addition, the bill contained a federal subsidy program to prevent utility rates from rising more
2 12
than ten percent in an attempt to keep down the cost of control.
Critics of H.R. 2666 and other similar bills, charged they were too
lax in some areas and too strict in others. 21 3 For example, some individuals advocated more stringent controls on emissions from plants which
are more than thirty years old. Such controls would force "retirement"
of old plants. 21 4 Conversely, others charged that H.R. 2666 was too
stringent in its rollback figures, contending that a two-stage approach
requiring a five to six million ton reduction in each stage would lessen the
economic hardship of higher initial rollbacks as well as allow the second(1987) (Solomon); H.R. 1679, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Cheney); H.R. 2666, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) (Sikorski); H.R. 3632, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Kemp); H.R. 4331, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1988) (Cooper).
209. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 661 (June 19, 1987).
210. See supra note 4. Mitchell has since been elected Senate majority leader, a fact which environmentalists hope will enable the 101st Congress to pass some acid rain legislation. 19 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1563 (Dec. 2, 1988). Some politicians are not so optimistic, however, since Mitchell plans to
resign as Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Environmental
Protection. This Subcommittee has primary jurisdiction over amendments to the Clean Air Act. 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1612-13 (Dec. 9, 1988).
211. H.R. 2666, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
212. As of March 5, 1988, H.R. 2666 had been combined with a comprehensive urban-smog bill,
H.R. 3054, and was being promoted as a general "clean-air" bill in an unnumbered draft. CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 579, March 5, 1988.
Another bill which was given considerable attention, S.321, was substantially similar to H.R.
2666 except that S.321 proposed SO 2 emission reduction at 12 (rather than 10) million tons per year.
Still another visible bill, S.95, also bore many similarities to H.R. 2666, but was particularly significant because of its cost-sharing program. This bill would have imposed an emission fee on all electrical utilities with the fee going into a trust fund. The fund money would then be used to help defray
capital costs in installing pollution control equipment.
213. These criticisms were voiced by former New Hampshire Governor John H. Sununu (now
Chief of Staff for President Bush), as applied specifically to S.321. Given the similarities of the bills
which were before the 100th Congress, however, the charges are equally applicable to each bill.
214. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 663 (June 19, 1987).
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stage efforts to benefit from the research and experience attained during
the first stage. 2 15
C. An Effective Remedy
The comprehensive rollbacks proposed by H.R. 2666 are definitely a
step in the right direction. Although the bill did not directly address the
question of interstate air pollution, the implication is that an across the
board reduction in emissions of pollutants would also reduce the interstate transport of those pollutants. However, rollbacks would not erase
the interstate pollution problem; much of the allowable remaining emissions in the Midwest will still drift to the Northeast.
To further complicate matters, existing political and economic realities are mandating a national cost-sharing program even though, from a
logical standpoint, the individual polluters should have to finance their
own pollution control. It seems unfair to impose a tax on emissions in
California to help subsidize pollution control measures in Ohio in order
save the Adirondack Mountains in New York. 2 16 However, the political
reality is that placing the economic burden of clean-up on a select group
of states will never be passed by Congress because of strong state representation. In addition, if the individual polluters are not given national
funding for control, they will simply pass on their costs to the consumer
who would then have to pay excessive utility rates. Therefore, a costallocation system such as a federal subsidy or trust fund is a necessary
prerequisite to the passage of acid rain control legislation.
The dilemma of causation and the identification of a specific source,
as required by the Clean Air Act, still remains, however. To date, both
the courts and the EPA have been unreceptive to recent advancements in
source identification. 2 17 Moreover, even if specific source identification
becomes widely accepted, aggregate source pollution arising from a particular geographical area will remain unchecked. Under the current
structure of the statute, individual sources contributing to interstate
transport of NOx and SO 2 will still be able to claim they are not "significantly" affecting the air of other states. Thus, the national trust fund or
subsidy proposed by the pending bills would remain idle with every individual polluter claiming a lack of significant contribution to the
aggregate.
215. Id.
216. At least one study has reported that over 25% of the lakes in the Adirondack Mountains
have become too acidic for many species. The 21st EnvironmentalQuality Index, NAT'L WILDLIFE,
Feb.-Mar. 1989, at 35.
217. See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text.
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It is therefore necessary to amend the interstate regulations to eliminate the specific source requirement and replace it with a general source
identification requirement. Section 115 of the international air pollution
regulations provides an example. This section allows a foreign agency to
identify an entire state as the source of international air pollution. 218 A
similar provision in the interstate regulations would enable an affected
area to identify a particular state as the source of pollution, and thus
allow for the aggregation of specific sources within a state which clearly
contribute to the interstate pollution problem. A SIP revision could then
be mandated requiring stricter controls within the state, and the state in
turn would become eligible for the national trust funds or subsidies. The
state would then distribute the funds between the plants with the largest
emissions, which would then be required to install pollution abatement
equipment.
Without a general source identification amendment, a national support system would be useless, since specific source identification has thus
far been unsuccessful. As evidenced by the applicable case law, the causation issue lies at the heart of the ineffectiveness of the interstate air
pollution regulations. Proposed legislation which ignores this current
major enforcement barrier will also prove to be inadequate.
CONCLUSION

The interstate air pollution dilemma is plagued with a myriad of
problems. The applicable statutes, sections 110 and 126, do not function
as a unit, which greatly hinders their effectiveness. In addition, their undefined and noncomprehensive statutory language provides another barrier to successful interstate pollution litigation. Alternative remedies for
enforcement have also proved fruitless. Yet awareness of these problems
has not prompted immediate action by Congress. The presence of political, economic, and scientific concerns over who is responsible and who
should have to finance pollution controls has defeated every attempt at
new legislation. After over ten years of debate, there still has been no
218. Whenever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys, or studies from any
duly constituted international agency has reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollution . . . in a foreign
country... the Administrator shall give formal notification thereof to the Governorof the
State in which such emissions originate. The notice of the Administrator shall be deemed to
be a finding under section 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) of this title which requires a plan revision ....
42 U.S.C. § 7415 (emphasis added).
This Note does not attempt to analyze the international law considerations which have burdened the acid rain control negotiations between the United States and Canada. The suggested use
of language contained in § 115 is made because of the ease of general source identification allowed by
that section.
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progress. As Congress continues to stall, the air in affected states becomes increasingly stale.

